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Abstract 
This paper examines whether investors flip their allocation less in bookbuilding than 
in auction IPOs. Based on bookbuilding theory, we posit that the ability to control allocation 
flexibility in the bookbuilding mechanism should enable underwriters to avoid flippers and 
target long-term investors. Consistent with this premise, we find that investors flip 
significantly less in bookbuilding IPOs, both in overall terms and separately for frequent and 
non-frequent investors. Frequent investors flip considerably less in IPOs that are managed by 
reputed underwriters and in IPOs that are weak. Both frequent as well as non-frequent 
investors in bookbuilding IPOs continue to hold their shares for much longer than investors in 
auction IPOs. The results highlight the benefits of allocation discretion which allows 
XQGHUZULWHUVWRLQIOXHQFHLQYHVWRUV¶EHKDYiour as well as use soft non-bid information in the 
IPO process. 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies have attempted to identify the most efficient method of allocating 
initial public offerings (IPOs).1 Despite some criticism, bookbuilding has become the leading 
selling mechanism around the world (Jagannathan et al., 2015).The debate on bookbuilding 
surrounds the discretionary power given to bookbuilding underwriters which allows them to 
exercise discretion in allocating shares to the investors. Proponents of bookbuilding argue 
that this discretion allows underwriters to extract information and incorporate non-bid 
information from investors, thus helping to increase the pricing efficiency of the IPO 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Sherman, 2000). On the other 
hand, critics of bookbuilding argue that the discretionary power allows underwriters to 
develop relations with investors for their mutual benefit (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; 
Nimalendran et al., 2007; Ritter, 2011). A few studies (Degeorge et al., 2007; Kutsuna and 
Smith, 2004; Lowry et al., 2010) have compared valuation efficiency and other pricing issues 
across bookbuilding and auction/fixed price mechanisms. However, no study, to the best of 
our knowledge, has compared flipping across different allocation mechanisms.2   
The degree of flipping by initial IPO investors is important to both issuers and 
underwriters. Aggarwal (2003) argues issuers want their shares to be allocated to long term 
LQYHVWRUV³VWURQJKDQGV´6LPLODUO\XQGHUZULWHUVZRXOGSUHIHUWKDWWheir IPOs do not have 
significant levels of flipping as this poses difficulties in stabilizing the IPO market, 
particularly of those IPOs with weak demand (Ellis, 2006).  Thus, identification of an IPO 
                                                 
1
 Bookbuilding, fixed price and auction mechanisms have been the three most commonly used mechanisms, 
although bookbuilding has become the most dominant in recent times. See Jagannathan et al. (2015) for a 
detailed discussion of the various allocation mechanisms and other issues associated with them.  
2
 Flipping refers to selling of IPO shares by investors in immediate period after the listing. Although prior 
studies have looked at flipping in bookbuilding Aggarwal R. Allocation of initial public offerings and flipping 
activity. Journal of Financial Economics 2003;68; 111-135, Krigman L, Shaw W, Womack K. The persistence 
of IPO mispricing and the predictive power of flipping. Journal of Finance 1999;54; 1015-1044 and auction 
Degeorge F, Derrien F, Womack K. Auctioned IPOs: The US Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 
2010;98; 177-194 IPOs separately, no prior study has compared flipping in these two mechanisms. 
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mechanism that minimises flipping should be in the interest of both issuers and underwriters. 
The main aim of our paper is to examine whether underwriters use the discretionary power 
allowed in the bookbuilding mechanism to place shares with investors who are less likely to 
flip their shares. In addition to the primary research question, we also develop other 
hypotheses (see section 2) based on the bookbuilding theory, which consider the implications 
of the long-term relationship between underwriters and regular/frequent investors 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Sherman, 2000).  
We examine these hypotheses in the Indian IPOs market that offers an ideal setting to 
test the flipping behaviour of investors in bookbuilding and auction IPOs for the following 
reasons. First, in late 2005, after a few years of experimentation with a modified form of 
bookbuilding mechanism, which allowed underwriters to exercise discretion in allocating 
shares to institutional investors, Indian regulators abandoned it in favour of a uniform price 
auction mechanism.3 The auction regime stripped underwriters of their discretionary 
allocation power. Therefore, the availability of flipping data on bookbuilding and auction 
regimes in this short time interval, pre- and post-regulatory change periods, allows us to 
examine the effectiveness of the two mechanisms in reducing flipping in a quasi-natural 
experimental setting.4 
Second, the Indian setting also provides us with a unique database which allows us to 
track every single trade made by foreign institutional investors (FII, hereafter). This publicly 
available database from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI, hereafter) 
contains every FII trade made since 2003. We are able to track every single allocation to FII 
                                                 
3
 See Bubna and Prabhala (2011) and Neupane S, Poshakwale S. Transparency in IPO Mechanism: Retail 
investors' participation, IPO pricing and returns. Journal of Banking and Finance 2012;36; 2064-2076 for a 
detailed description of the two regimes relevant to our study. 
4
 Bubna A, Prabhala NR. IPOs with and without Allocation Discretion: Empirical Evidence. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 2011;20; 530-561 use this setting to investigate pre-market price discovery, 
underpricing, bidding and allocation and show that in bookbuilding underwriters extensively exercise discretion 
in allocation. Our study differs substantially from theirs, but complements their findings on discretionary role of 
underwrites, as we examine the role of discretion on flipping in the post-IPO trading period.    
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from the date of IPO allocation to the time they are finally sold.5 Although a subset of the 
overall IPO allocation, FII constitute one of the largest institutional investor categories ± they 
receive about 50 percent of the institutional allocation which translates into about 25 percent 
of the total shares offered in the IPO. Our sample consists of 45 bookbuilding and 58 auction 
Indian IPOs, all issued during a three-year window between 2004 and 2006. We identify a 
total of 3,009 individual FII allocations for these 103 IPOs and initially analyse flipping in 
the first three days of listing.  
Several important findings emerge from this study. First, reflecting the implications 
of discretionary allocation ability of underwriters, we find that investors flip significantly less 
in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. Second, our result holds for both frequent and non-
frequent IPO investors. Consistent with the view that bookbuilding allows underwriters to 
develop long-term relations with investors; we find that frequent investors not only flip 
significantly less in IPOs managed by high reputation underwriters, but also in IPOs with 
weak demand. Given that both bookbuilding and auction regimes have the same set of 
frequent investors and high reputation underwriters, our evidence suggests that the 
withdrawal of allocation powers in the auction regime brought about a significant change in 
the flipping behaviour of these investors. As Indian underwriters extensively exercised 
allocation discretion when permitted to do so (Bubna and Prabhala, 2011), our result suggests 
that investors valued and considered such discretion when flipping their shares. Further, low 
levels of flipping by non-frequent investors in bookbuilding implies that the discretionary 
power enables the underwriters to target investors who are less likely to flip. Finally, we also 
find less flipping in bookbuilding over the longer term in post IPO trading in periods up to six 
months after listing. The evidence shows a significant difference in long-term holdings across 
                                                 
5
 We describe this database in detail in Section 3.  
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the two IPO mechanisms for both frequent and non-frequent investors with the effect stronger 
in IPOs managed by high reputation underwriters for frequent investors.  
Our paper makes two contributions to the IPO literature. First, it offers new evidence 
on the flipping behaviour of investors across the two main IPO allocation mechanisms. We 
contribute to the debate on the efficiency of IPO mechanisms and show that giving 
underwriters allocation discretion can help reduce flipping by IPO investors. Second, we also 
present evidence on the less discussed non-frequent investors participating in IPOs. Our 
evidence suggests that the discretionary power allows underwriters to target and 
preferentially allocate shares to long-term investors who might be of strategic interest to the 
firm involved. At the very least, the significant exit of long-term investors with the change of 
regime suggests that the presence of allocation flexibility encourages long-term investors to 
selectively participate in IPOs that are of interest to them.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Sections 3 presents the data and the summary statistics. In Sections 4 and 5 we present our 
empirical analysis. Section 6 offers some robustness tests and section 7 concludes the paper.         
2. Hypotheses development 
A key difference between the bookbuilding and auction IPO mechanisms is the   
discretion available to underwriters in allocating shares. In contrast to auction IPOs, under the 
bookbuilding mechanism underwriters are allowed to exercise discretion in determining the 
share allocation rules. Proponents of the bookbuilding mechanism argue that this discretion 
allows underwriters to improve the efficiency and attain the objectives of the offering. One of 
the objectives of the offering, as cited by investment banks, is the preferential allocation of 
shares to individuals/institutions who are long term investors. This practice is commonly 
known as the pitchbook view of bookbuilding (Nimalendran et al., 2007). Consistent with 
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this view, in their analysis of bookbuilding IPOs, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and 
Jenkinson and Jones (2004) report evidence of preferential allocation to investors who are 
perceived to be long-term holders of the stock. Also, in a survey of institutional investors, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2009) show that investors believe that their chance of receiving 
allocations improve if they are perceived as long-term investors.  
The IPO listing process involves repeated interaction between underwriters and 
investors interested in subscribing to the IPOs. Existing research suggests that this setting 
coupled with the allocation discretion available to bookbuilding underwriters allows them to 
develop a sustained relation with a network of IPO investors. By rewarding the investors 
(through greater allocation of underpriced shares) and/or threatening them (with exclusion 
from the network), underwriters can influence LQYHVWRUV¶ behaviour to achieve the objectives 
of the offering. Thus, unlike in auction mechanism, underwriters in bookbuilding can 
discourage investors from flipping by threatening them with exclusions from future share 
allocations. Given that underwriters in auction mechanism do not have allocation discretion 
and consequently no power in penalizing flippers (Degeorge et al., 2010), our first main 
hypothesis is: 
H1: IPO investors flip less in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. 
Based on the findings in the IPO literature we further develop H1 three sub-
hypotheses that centre on the allocation discretion and reputation of the underwriters, the 
strength of the offering and the investing behaviour of the investors.  
 High reputation (top-tier) underwriters not only manage the top IPOs and raise the 
most proceeds, they also have a broader network of investors than less reputed underwriters 
(Wang and Yung, 2011). Moreover, the top-tier underwriters have more established 
relationships with their IPO investors, which they can use to successfully manage even low 
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quality offerings. Hence, if allocation discretion assists underwriter in discouraging investors 
from flipping immediately, then this relation should be more pronounced in IPOs managed by 
high reputation underwriters. This leads to our first sub-hypothesis which argues that: 
H1a: For IPOs managed by high reputation underwriters, investors flip less under the 
bookbuilding mechanism in comparison to auction IPOs. 
Further, if underwriters in bookbuilding mechanism do indeed discourage investors 
from flipping shares, then this should be more prominent in weaker offerings where flipping 
is a bigger concern. Degeorge et al. (2010) find that investors in auction IPOs are equally 
OLNHO\ WR IOLS LQ ERWK FROG DQG KRW ,32V DQG VXJJHVW WKDW WKLV LV GXH WR WKH XQGHUZULWHUV¶
inability to control allocations. This leads to our second sub-hypothesis which argues that: 
H1b: In IPOs where the demand is weak, investors flip less in bookbuilding than in auction 
IPOs. 
7KH XQGHUZULWHUV¶ network of investors is likely to include both frequent and non-
frequent investors. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) show that allocation priority is given to an 
underwULWHU¶V IUHTXHQW LQYHVWRUV DV FRPSHQVDWLRQ IRU LQIRUPDWLRQ UHYHODWLRQ Hence, if 
repeated interaction between underwriter and investors leads to reduced flipping, then this 
effect should be more pronounced with frequent investors. This leads to our final sub-
hypothesis where we suggest that: 
H1c: Frequent investors in bookbuilding IPOs should flip less than frequent investors in 
auction IPOs. 
Finally, if bookbuilding underwriters are able to allocate shares to long-term 
investors, then these investors should not only flip less in the immediate aftermarket, but 
should also hold their shares for a longer period of time. In other words, investors in 
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bookbuilding IPOs should hold on to their allocation for a longer period of time compared to 
investors in auction IPOs. This leads to our second main hypothesis that: 
H2: Investors in IPOs retain their allocation for longer periods under bookbuilding in 
comparison to auction mechanism.6 
3. Data and summary statistics 
Based on data availability our sample of FII trades begins in 2004. To capture the 
impact of the change in rules governing the method of IPO flotation we restrict our sample 
period to the end of 2006. The list of IPOs during the sample period was obtained from the 
BSE/NSE website. In total 188 IPOs were issued during this period. We excluded 41 fixed-
price offerings because FIIs rarely subscribe to fixed price IPOs. Also 13 large privatization 
IPOs were excluded because of their size and the nature of the deals. Finally, a further 21 
IPOs were excluded because of missing data. Our final sample consists of 103 IPOs which 
includes 45 bookbuilding and 58 auction IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
and/or National Stock Exchange (NSE) between 2004 and 2006. The data on firm (assets and 
age) and offer characteristics (proceeds, shares offered and underwriters) were hand collected 
from the offer documents. Data on demand, bids and first day closing stock price were 
obtained from the BSE/NSE website. Return on the BSE Sensex index is used to calculate the 
market-adjusted underpricing.   
The data on FII trades was obtained from the SEBI-endorsed NSDL FPI Monitor 
database.7 This is a publicly available database that monitors and reports all FII trades from 
the beginning of January 2003. The database contains several fields, including the FII 
registration number, scrip name and ISIN code, transaction date, transaction type, transaction 
                                                 
6
 In our empirical analysis, we examine long term holdings by IPO mechanism for both frequent and non-
frequent investors.   
7
 https://www.fpi.nsdl.co.in/web/Default.aspx 
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rate and transaction value (in INRs). 7KHILHOG³WUDQVDFWLRQW\SH´KHOSVWRLGHQWLI\ZKHWKHUD
trade is a buy or sell and whether it is a primary or secondary market trade. A total of 3,009 
primary trades for our sample of 103 IPOs were found. We use the data from these trades to 
determine IPO allocations to FII. Since every trade is assigned to a particular FII registration 
number, we then track trades by the registration number to determine flipping by FII.   
We compare the FII allocation data obtained from NSDL FPI Monitor database with 
overall IPO allocation data that is publicly available for a large number of our IPOs.8 These 
publicly available data sources provide information on share allocation to the different 
investor categories, including allocation to FII. We found data for 93 of the 103 IPOs and the 
data from these two sources is almost identical ensuring reliability of our data. 
We use the market share of underwriters to classify them as high/low reputation 
underwriters and assign the proceeds raised on a pro rata basis to all the lead managers in the 
IPO. A total of 30 underwriters manage the 103 sample IPOs, 21 of them were involved in 
bookbuilding and 28 in auction IPOs. A majority of these IPOs (85 out of the 103) were 
managed by either one or two underwriters. Following Bubna and Prabhala (2011), we 
classify an underwriter as high reputation if it ranks in the top five in the year of offering. We 
find that the sets of high reputation underwriters are almost identical in the two regimes. 
Unsurprisingly, these underwriters not only raise the most proceeds but they also manage the 
majority of the IPOs. Therefore, our classification yields exactly the same outcome if we use 
the number of offerings instead of the proceeds of the IPOs.9 
[Insert Table 1 here]             
                                                 
8
 We gather this allocation data from BSE/NSE website as well as from other websites, such as chittorgarh.com, 
which is considered the premium IPO portal in India.  
9
 Alternatively, we also look at the total proceeds raised in our three-year sample period to classify underwriters 
and arrive at an almost identical classification as obtained from the yearly data. 
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Table 1 reports summary statistics related to firm and offer characteristics (Panel A 
The key features of allocation and flipping for the full sample, bookbuilding IPOs, and 
auction IPOs are reported in Panel B. Panel A shows that bookbuilding IPOs do not differ 
significantly from auction IPOs in terms of firm and offer characteristics. This suggests that 
although the sample period witnessed a change in regulatory system, there was no significant 
change in the characteristics of the IPO firms. The demand multiple and the number of 
institutional bids appear to be slightly lower in auction IPOs which can be attributed to bidder 
exit (as described in Bubna and Prabhala, 2011). Panel B (Table 1) shows that FIIs receive 
about 52 percent of the institutional allocation, which translates to an allocation of about 25 
percent of the total offering. We also find that the allocation to FII is similar across the two 
regimes. The average size of allocation in the median overall IPO is about 136 thousand 
shares, and we do not find any significant difference in allocation between bookbuilding and 
auction IPOs. 
For the overall sample (column 1), FII flip about 43 percent of the allocated shares in 
the first three days of trading. In unreported results we find that average flipping is 45 percent 
in the first seven days and 47 percent in first month of listing. Thus, investors who wish to 
flip their IPO allocations appear to do so in the first few days of listing. The percentage of 
flipping by FII in Indian IPOs is higher than the weighted average of about 26 percent 
reported for institutional investors in US IPOs in Aggarwal (2003).  
The estimates in Table 1 show a significant difference in flipping between 
bookbuilding and auction IPOs. Flipping in the median bookbuilding IPO is 40 percent in the 
first three days of trading compared to 52 percent in the median auction IPO. Thus, the 
aggregate summary statistics, consistent with our first hypothesis (H1), show that 
bookbuilding investors, on average, appear to flip less than auction investors.  
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In summary, the three key observations from the summary statistics are: (i) both 
bookbuilding and auction IPOs have similar firm and offer characteristics; (ii) investor 
demand and overall allocation across the two mechanisms are similar; and (iii) flipping is 
significantly lower in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs.    
 
4. Investor flipping in bookbuilding versus auction IPOs 
Table 2 presents a comparative (univariate) analysis of shares allocated and flipped 
based for full-sample (column 1), bookbuilding (column 2), and auction (column 3) IPOs. 
Given that IPO investors  are likely to flip their shares if they receive only a small allocation, 
perhaps due to rationing caused by high demand (Ellis, 2006), we split the sample into 
terciles based on shares allocated as a percentage of allocation to FIIs.10.  
The estimates show that there is a significant difference in the allocation and flipping 
of shares across the terciles. An investor receives about 0.1 percent of total FII allocation in 
the lowest and approximately 2 percent in the middle tercile. The average investor in the top 
tercile receives about 11 percent of the allocation which translates to, on average, a sizeable 
2.75 percent of the total shares on offer.11 The allocations are similar in both bookbuilding 
and auction IPOs. However, there is no systematic pattern between flipping and allocation 
across the terciles. The average flipping is 36 percent in the first tercile, 45 percent in the 
second and 38 percent in the third tercile of the full-sample. In bookbuilding average flipping 
appears to be relatively stable across the terciles (insignificant F-statistic). However, it varies 
significantly in auction IPOs. In auction investors within the second tercile flip about 53 
percent of their allocations while it is only 42 percent in both the first and the third terciles. 
                                                 
10
 Individual allocations are placed in to three categories based on the fraction of shares allocated relative to the 
total shares offered in the IPO. We also create terciles using alternative approaches ±see Section 7.2 for further 
discussion.   
11
 As discussed earlier, FIIs receive about 50 percent of the allocation in the institutional investor category. The 
institutional investor category, in turn, is allocated about 50 percent of the total shares on offer.  
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The difference in median flipping is even more dramatic ± close to zero in the first and 61 
percent in the second. More importantly, consistent with the evidence from summary 
statistics the difference in flipping between bookbuilding and auction IPOs is statistically 
significant. Further, although the difference is significant in all three terciles the difference is 
highest (21 percent) in the second tercile. Since the investors in the top tercile receive larger 
allocation (11 percent on average), even a small proportion of flipping of shares allocated to 
them is likely to have a much higher economic implication. Overall, the evidence from 
univariate analysis of flipping provides support to our first hypothesis (H1) that investors flip 
less in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs.      
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Next we compare the compare the level of flipping in multivariate regression 
framework (in Equation 1 below) where the possible implications of other factors are 
controlled for.  
 
Where, the dependent variable (ܨ݈௜) is the proportion of shares flipped by FFIi as a 
percentage of their allocation within the first three days of listing.  The variable of interest is 
the mechanism dummy that takes the value of 1 for bookbuilding and 0 for auction IPOs. The 
vector (Xi,j) represents control variables (market condition, underwriter reputation, and IPO 
proceeds) that are known to affect flipping. Since we are interested in inveVWRUV¶EHKDYLRXULQ
weaker IPOs we also include a cold dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
underpricing is 10 percent or less and zero otherwise.12 All variables are defined in Appendix 
                                                 
12
 We use the 10 percent cut-off to consider cold and cool IPOs (Ellis, 2006). We re-run our analysis using 
alternative definitions of cold IPOs. See the discussion on alternative specifications in Section 6.2.  
ܨ݈௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܯ݄݁ܿܽ݊݅ݏ݉௜ ൅෍ߛ௝ܺ௜ǡ௝ ൅ ߝே௝ୀଵ  (1)  
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A. The estimates are controlled for industry fixed effects13 and the results are presented in 
Table 3. 
The estimates for the full-sample are given in Specification (1). Specifications (2) ± 
(4) show the results for each of the three IPO allocation terciles.  The statistically significant 
negative coefficient of mechanism dummy (at 1 % level) supports our first hypothesis (H1) 
that IPO investors flip less in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. Investors in bookbuilding 
flip approximately 8 percent less than in auction IPOs. Further, this result also holds for the 
second and third allocation terciles (significant at the 1% level). Although the coefficient on 
the mechanism dummy is higher in the second tercile (15.8% in comparison to 6.5%), 
investors in the top tercile receive, on average, almost twice the number of shares than 
investors in the second tercile. Thus, although the size of the coefficients are different, the 
economic significance of the difference in flipping across the two mechanisms for the second 
and third terciles is similar. The mechanism dummy is insignificant in the bottom tercile, but 
as this group receives a very small allocation, it is possible this means that their flipping 
behaviour is similar under both methods of IPO flotation. 
Among the control variables, for the full sample market condition is significantly 
positively related to flipping, although significant only for the top tercile when we consider 
the three groups. Underwriter reputation, on the other hand, is significantly negatively related 
to flipping, for the overall sample and the top allocation tercile. In fact, for the top tercile 
(specification 4), underwriterV¶ reputation appears to be economically more significant than 
the selling mechanism. Investors who receive allocation in the top tercile are likely to flip 
about 11 percent less in IPOs that are managed by high reputation underwriters. Flipping is 
also significantly negatively related to the offer size in all specifications. The negative 
                                                 
13
 We group IPO firms into 11 industry sectors: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, healthcare, 
industrials, financials, information technology, utilities, materials and telecommunication services.                 
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coefficient of cold IPO dummy is significant for the overall sample and weakly significant for 
the second tercile. 
[Insert Table 3 here]     
4.1. Underwriter reputation and investor demand  
To test hypotheses (H1a) and (H1b) two interaction terms are introduced in equation 
(1). To estimate the joint effect of underwriters and the IPO selling methods an interaction 
term between mechanism and underwriter reputation (Mechanism ×  Reputation) is included. 
Also to examine if investors flip weaker IPOs less in bookbuilding than in auction, an 
interaction between mechanism and cold IPOs (Mechanism × Cold) is added. The results are 
presented in specifications (5) ± (8) of Table 3. The coefficients of interaction between 
mechanism and reputation are negative and significant for the full sample and the top two 
allocation terciles. This provides support for our first sub-hypothesis (H1a) as investors flip 
less in bookbuilding if the IPOs are managed by high reputation underwriters. Given we find 
that the leading underwriters are the same across the two regimes, the results confirm that 
investors flipping behaviour is significantly affected by the discretionary allocation power of 
the underwriters. Further, the estimate in specification (8) suggests that investors in the top 
tercile flip approximately 15 percent less in bookbuilding IPOs if they are managed by 
leading underwriters.  
The negative and significant coefficients of interaction between IPO mechanism and 
cold IPO (overall and in the bottom two terciles) suggests that in bookbuilding IPOs investors 
flip less in weak  IPOs than in their comparable auction IPOs. This is consistent with the 
prediction of hypothesis H1b that in weak IPOs investors flip less in bookbuilding than in 
auction.  
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Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that bookbuilding IPOs have considerably less 
flipping by investors in comparison to auction IPOs and difference is more prominent in IPOs 
where the demand is weak and that are managed by high reputation underwriters. 
4.2. Frequent and non-frequent investors 
For the reasons described earlier, H1c SRVLWV WKDW µfrequent IPO investors flip less in 
bookbuilding than in auction IPOs¶. To test this hypothesis, we compare flipping between 
frequent and non-frequent FII. As in Bubna and Prabhala (2011) the tests are performed at the 
fund family level as data to track individual bidders across IPOs is not available. We define 
frequent investors as those belonging to a fund family that has subscribed at least 10 IPOs in 
either of the flotation regimes. Table 4 (Panel A) shows that the sample of 3,009 individual 
IPO bidders belong to 398 fund families. 304 fund families participate in bookbuilding and 
243 in auction IPOs. Although several funds participate regularly in Indian IPOs a large 
number of fund families seem to be infrequent investors. 187 fund families have invested 
only on one or two IPOs and 162 fund families have participated on three to nine IPOs. Only 
49 funds invested in 10 or more IPOs. 
A significant number of bidders who participate in bookbuilding exit in the auction 
era. Only 149 out of the 304 bookbuilding fund families invest in auction IPOs. However, 
bidder exit is primarily in the non-frequent investor category. While only 47 of the 154 fund 
families who invest in one or two bookbuilding IPOs invest again in auction IPOs, all of the 
44 fund families that invest in 10 or more bookbuilding IPOs not only participate in auction 
IPOs, but participate in them frequently. Thus, frequent bidders in the bookbuilding IPOs 
continue to participate frequently in the auction regime as well. In bookbuilding IPOs, the 
median fund family participates in 9 IPOs while the 75th percentile bids in 18 IPOs; in 
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auction IPOs, the median (75th percentile) family participates in 15 (28) IPOs.14 For the 
purpose of our analysis, we classify frequent investors as those that belong to families that 
bid in at least 10 IPOs in either of the selling regimes. By employing this categorization, we 
have a set of frequent investors that are almost identical in both the selling regimes.15  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Panel B (Table 4) provides a univariate analysis of flipping by frequent and non-
frequent investors. The estimates show that most of the bids by frequent investors receive an 
allocation in the top tercile. For instance, within the top tercile, 50 percent (819) of frequent 
investors receive an allocation, but it is only about 10 percent (144) in the cases of non-
frequent investors. Frequent investors flip significantly more of their allocation than non-
frequent investors (48% vs. 31%). This difference in flipping between frequent and non-
frequent investors is 19 percent in bookbuilding IPOs and about 11 percent in auction IPOs.  
However the estimates also show that both frequent and non-frequent investors flip less in 
bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. Consistent with hypothesis H1c, frequent investors flip 
about 8 percent less in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. Similarly, non-frequent investors 
flip about 16% less in bookbuilding IPOs than in auction IPOs. Therefore, the univariate 
results suggest that the difference in flipping that we observe between bookbuilding and 
auction mechanisms is consistent for both frequent and non-frequent IPO investors. 
Panel C in Table 4 shows that both frequent and non-frequent investors flip less in the 
top two terciles of the allocation for both bookbuilding and auction IPOs. The median 
frequent investor in the top (middle) tercile in bookbuilding flips 17 (34) percent less than the 
                                                 
14
 Our figures are different from those of Bubna and Prabhala (2011), as we use a much larger sample than theirs 
(45 vs. 25). 
15
 There are five frequent fund families that are new in auction IPOs. For robustness purposes we re-run all our 
analysis by excluding these family funds. Our results remain qualitatively similar. Also see the section on 
robustness tests (Section 9), where we discuss alternative specifications of frequent investors.  
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median investor in auction IPOs. Given that the median frequent investor in the top tercile 
receives about 6 percent of total FII allocation, the difference in flipping between the two 
selling mechanism is economically significant. As for the non-frequent investors, although 
the median investor in the second tercile holds on to their entire allocation, the median 
investor in the auction mechanism flips about 28% of their allocation.    
We further examine the flipping behaviour of frequent and non-frequent investors in a 
multivariate framework based on equation (1) which is estimated separately for the two 
categories of investors. We also modify equation (1) to further examine hypothesis H1a 
(underwriter reputation) and H1b (weak IPOs) separately for the two investor categories. The 
results are reported in Table 5.16,17     
7KH QHJDWLYH DQG VLJQLILFDQW FRHIILFLHQWV RI µmechanism¶ LQ specifications (1) ± (3) 
suggest that the frequent investors flip less in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. This is 
consistent with the predictions of hypothesis (H1c). This evidence holds for the top two 
terciles as well. Underwriter reputation is significantly negatively related to flipping for 
frequent investors, for the overall sample and the top allocation tercile. However, in overall 
terms, there is no evidence to suggest that frequent investors flip less in weak IPOs. In 
specifications (4) ± (6), we add the two previously discussed interaction terms: mechanism 
and underwriter reputation (Mechanism ×  Reputation) and mechanism and cold IPOs 
(Mechanism × Cold). For the top two terciles, frequent investors in bookbuilding IPOs 
appear to flip less in weak IPOs and IPOs that are managed by high reputation underwriters. 
As indicated by the coefficient of the interaction variable, under bookbuilding frequent 
                                                 
16
 In unreported results, we repeat the analysis presented in Table 3 by also including the frequent investor 
dummy variable. We find that the frequent investor variable is positive and significant not only for the overall 
sample, but also for the top two allocation terciles. 
17
 To conserve space, we only report results for the overall sample and the top two quartiles. As discussed 
before, the bottom tercile is relatively less important as the median investor in this tercile receives only 0.1 
percent of the total FII allocation. 
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investors flip 46 percent less if the IPOs are managed by leading underwriters in the 
bookbuilding regime (specification 5) and  approximately16 percent less in the top tercile 
(where due to the size of the allocation the economic effect is only marginally weaker). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
In specifications (7) ± (12), we repeat the analysis for non-frequent investors. The 
estimates show a significant negative relation for the overall sample and the 2nd tercile 
indicating that non-frequent investors flip less in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs.  The 
average non-frequent investor flips just over nine percent less in bookbuilding. However, 
average investors in the 2nd tercile flip nearly 20 percent less in bookbuilding IPOs than in 
auction IPOs. Thus, the analysis in Table 5 shows that both frequent and non-frequent 
investors flip significantly less in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. It is noteworthy that 
none of the interaction terms in specifications (9) ± (12) are significant for non-frequent 
investors. Overall, the effects of the discretionary power of the bookbuilding mechanism 
which allows the underwriters to target and preferentially allocate shares to long-term holders 
is also supported by the evidence that even the non-frequent investors flip less in 
bookbuilding.18            
5. Long-term holdings 
This section examines hypothesis 2 (H2) examining if subscribers of IPOs retain their 
allocation for longer term in bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. If bookbuilding underwriters 
are able to allocate shares to long-term investors then they should dispose less of their 
allocation over a longer period than the investors in auction IPOs. We track each of the 3,009 
individual allocations for six months after the IPO listing.19 Table 6 (Panel A) provides a 
                                                 
18
 In unreported results, we re-run all the analysis using flipping data for the first seven days as well as for the 
first month of listing. All our results are qualitatively similar. 
19
 The results, available on request, are qualitatively similar when one year holding period is used.  
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univariate analysis of shares sold by IPO mechanism, relative to the allocation they had 
received, at the end of six months of listing. The estimates show that a significantly lower 
proportion of shares being sold within the first six months under bookbuilding than in auction 
IPOs. This result holds for both frequent and non-frequent IPO investors. The overall 
difference in the percentage of shares sold between bookbuilding and auction IPOs is 
approximately 9 percent at the end of six months; with the difference of 14 percent for non-
frequent investors and 6 percent for frequent investors. 
In Panel B we present the statistics by allocation terciles. For frequent investors, the 
difference in the fraction of shares sold across the two regimes narrows over time and also 
becomes statistically less significant. For non-frequent investors, on the other hand, the 
difference in shares sold across the two regimes remains both economically as well as 
statistically significant even at the end of the six months of listing. The median non-frequent 
investor in the second allocation tercile holds on to their entire allocation, compared to the 
median non-frequent investor in the auction regime who disposes of about 76 percent of their 
allocation.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
To assess the implications of IPO mechanism on long-term holdings after controlling 
for the effects of other factors equation (2) is estimated as follows:  
 
In Equation (2), the dependent variable (Soldi) is the percentage of shares sold by 
investor i within the first six months relative to the allocation received. The vector of control 
ܵ݋݈݀௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܯ݄݁ܿܽ݊݅ݏ݉௜ ൅෍ߛ௝ܺ௜ǡ௝ ൅ ߝே௝ୀଵ  (2)  
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variables (Xi,j) includes stock return20XQGHUZULWHUV¶UHSXWDWLRQ,32SURFHHGVDQGDGXPP\
variable representing weak  IPOs.  All variables are defined in Appendix A. In the estimate 
we control for industry fixed effects and the results are presented in Table 7. 
Estimates in specifications (1) ± (3), show that the IPO mechanism does not appear to 
affect the long-term selling behaviour of the frequent investors. However, when we interact 
mechanism with underwriter reputation in the model (specifications 4 and 5), we find a 
significant negative relation with the IPO mechanism for the full sample as well as for mid-
tercile. Similarly, when we interact the mechanism with the weak IPOs we find a significant 
negative relation. The results for non-frequent investors are reported in specifications (7) ± 
(12). The difference in post listing disposal based on the IPO mechanism is significant only in 
the case of the second tercile. However, none of the interaction terms are significant.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
As an additional test of long-term holdings, we analyse investors holding their entire 
allocation until the end of six months from listing. We perform a probit regression analysis 
and present the results in Table 8, where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the 
investor holds on to his/her entire allocation for six months and 0 otherwise. All explanatory 
variables remain the same as in equation (2). In the case of frequent investors (specifications 
1-3), the coefficients of mechanism dummy are statistically significant in all but one case 
(specification 3). Similarly, the coefficients of the interaction of mechanism dummy with 
underwriter reputation and weak IPOs (Mechanism × Reputation, and Mechanism × Cold) 
are generally significant. Consistent with our earlier evidence, estimates show that non-
                                                 
20
 In addition to annualised return (as defined in Appendix A) we also use buy-and hold return, annualized 
returns based on the average daily returns for the first three, four and five months. The results, available on 
request, are qualitatively similar.  
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frequent investors in the middle tercile are more likely to hold on to their entire allocation in 
bookbuilding IPOs than in auction IPOs (specification 8).21    
[Insert Table 8 here] 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1. Excluding IPOs from the last six months of bookbuilding regime 
Our sample includes 13 IPOs that were issued in the last six months of bookbuilding 
regime. As the forthcoming change in regulation was in public domain, inclusion of these 
IPOs in the sample could  introduce a downward bias in the estimates. An obvious concern is 
also with long-term analysis, as the six-month period for this sub-sample of IPOs would 
extend into the auction regime. Hence, we re-run all the analysis by excluding these 13 IPOs 
and the 564 IPO allocations associated with them. The results (available on request) show 
that overall flipping is about 5 percent higher (statistically significant) in these 13 
bookbuilding IPO compared to the other 32 IPOs. 
Further, there are a few interesting results in the multivariate regressions of the 
reduced sample. First, the magnitude of the coefficients of the mechanism dummy across all 
the specifications is markedly larger. For instance, in specification (4) in Table 3 the 
coefficient of mechanism is 0.065, but it is 0.079 for the reduced sample. Second, for 
frequent investors, the coefficients of the mechanism dummy and its interaction with the 
reputation of the underwriters (Mechanism × Reputation) are also higher. Third, in the cases 
of long-term holdings of frequent investors, the coefficients of the mechanism dummy are 
also significant for the top two terciles. Finally, the coefficients of mechanism dummy in 
non-frequent investors¶FDVH are also markedly higher. Overall, these additional tests provide 
                                                 
21
 In unreported results, we re-run the analysis by using holdings of at least 50 percent and at least 75 percent of 
the initial allocation as the threshold. Our results remain qualitatively similar. Our results also hold when we use 
LQYHVWRUV¶KROGLQJVDWWKHHQGRI\HDURIWKHOLVWLQJ 
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further support for the findings discussed earlier in the paper that that investors (particularly 
for frequent investors) in bookbuilding IPOs flip significantly less than investors in auction 
IPOs.      
6.2. Alternative specifications 
We investigate the robustness of all empirical results to variations in our 
specifications. First, instead of using the 10 percent first day return as the threshold to 
identify weak IPOs, we use (i) IPOs with negative returns, and (ii) IPOs with returns below 
the overall median return as alternative measures for weak  IPOs. As in Bubna and Prabhala 
(2011), we also use the level of oversubscription (below and above median) to classify firms 
as weak IPOs. All our results remain qualitatively similar to these alternative specifications 
(the results are available from the authors on request).  
Second, to classify the investors into frequent and non-frequent, we use several 
alternative specifications. Instead of using the cut-off of investing in 10 IPOs, we re-run all 
our analysis by defining frequent investors as those (i) who participate in at least 18 IPOs (the 
75th percentile for bookbuilding IPOs) in each of the selling regimes and (ii) a combined total 
of at least 38 IPOs in the two regimes (the 75th percentile for the number of IPOs participated 
in by fund families in the two regimes ± see Panel A, Table 4). Again, all our results remain 
qualitatively similar.  
Finally, we also use alternative approaches to construct allocation terciles. We created 
terciles based on allocation separately for bookbuilding IPOs and auction IPOs; terciles based 
on the allocation of each individual IPO; terciles based on shares allocated as a percentage of 
total institutional quota; and terciles based on shares allocated as a percentage of total 
offering. All results are qualitatively similar across all the alternative specifications and are 
available from the authors on request.      
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7. Conclusion 
The discretion available to underwriters in the bookbuilding mechanism to control 
allocation has been a source of the debate on whether bookbuilding is superior to the auction 
method of bringing new issues to the market. Despite bookbuilding being a leading 
mechanism around the world, critics argue that the information extraction benefit of the 
bookbuilding can also be achieved through alternative mechanisms such as auctions, where 
potential for manipulation and abuse is less. However, studies in support of bookbuilding 
show that the most effective approach to incorporate non-bid information is to allow 
flexibility in pricing and allocation. The paper contributes to this debate and provides new 
evidence on the importance of discretion in bookbuilding by examining the flipping 
behaviour of FII across bookbuilding and auction IPOs in India.  
In a quasi-natural experiment setting of the Indian market, the findings of the paper 
are consistent with the theoretical arguments often attached to bookbuilding that 
XQGHUZULWHUV¶ flexibility in allocation should not only help them to avoid allocation to 
flippers, but also help develop long-term relationships with IPO investors. We find that both 
frequent as well as non-frequent investors flip significantly less in bookbuilding than in 
auction IPOs. Further, frequent investors, who are almost identical across the two selling 
regimes and receive the bulk of the allocation, appear to flip significantly less in IPOs 
managed by leading underwriters (who are also the same in the two mechanisms). They also 
flip less in weaker IPOs providing support to both underwriters and issuers. The evidence 
from the analysis of longer term holdings post IPO floatation show that a larger proportion of 
IPO subscribers hold on to their entire allocation at least for six months of listing in 
bookbuilding than in auction IPOs. 
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Overall, our findings, as well as those presented in Bubna and Prabhala (2011), 
suggests that allocation discretion available to underwriters appears to benefit both issuers 
and underwriters. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the flexibility in allocation not 
only helps in improving the pre-market price discovery, but also in influencing the behaviour 
of the frequent investors as well as to incorporate soft non-bid information by preferentially 
allocating shares to long-term investors.     
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Appendix A: Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
Mechanism A dummy variable that take the value of 1 for bookbuilding IPOs and 0 for auction 
IPOs 
Assets (INR Mill) The book value of total assets at the time of IPO in INR millions. 
 
Age 'LIIHUHQFHLQ\HDUVEHWZHHQDILUP¶V,32\HDUDQGWKHIRXQGLQJ\HDU 
 
Proceeds (INR Mill) Gross proceeds of the offer calculated by multiplying the offer price by the number 
of shares offered. 
Shares offered (Mill) Total number of shares offered in the IPO offering (in millions). 
 
Underwriter reputation/Leading 
underwriters 
The binary variable which equals 1 for reputed/leading underwriters and 0 otherwise. 
Following Bubna and Prabhala (2011), we categorize underwriters as reputable who 
are ranked top 5 in the year of offering, and zero otherwise.  
 
Market condition The weighted average of the buy-and-hold returns on the BSE Sensex index in the 
three months prior to the IPO issue opening date t; the weights being 3 for the month 
before the IPO date (Mt-1), 2 for the month before that (Mt-2), and 1 for the third 
month before the offering (Mt-3). 
  
Stock return Annualized return based on the average daily stock returns for the first six months of 
listing, excluding the return on the first day of listing 
  
Total demand multiple 
(oversubscription) 
The ratio of total shares bid by all investors to the total number of shares offered.  
 
No of Institutional Bids Total number of bids submitted by institutional investors. 
Institutional Demand Multiple The ratio of total shares bid by the institutional investors to the total number of shares 
offered to institutional investors. 
 
Underpricing The market adjusted first day returns. Market adjusted first day returns in the 
difference between raw first day return and market return, where the market return is 
the return on the BSE Sensex index over the same period. Raw first day return is the 
simple return calculated between the offer price and the closing price at the end of 
the first day of trading. 
 
Share allocated to FII as  percent of 
total institutional quota 
The percentage of share reserved for institutional investors which is allocated to 
foreign institutional investors (FII). 
 
Average size of institutional 
DOORFDWLRQµ 
The average number of shares allocated to FII 
Shares allocated as a percent of total 
FII allocation 
The percentage of shares allocated to each individual investor relative to the total 
shares offered to all the FII investors in the IPO.  
Shares flipped as  percent of 
allocation 
The percentage of shares allocated which is sold (flipped) in the first 3 days of 
listing. 
 
Frequent FII Investors A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPO investors who have invested in at 
least 15 IPOs either in bookbuilding or auction IPOs.  
  
Terciles of Allocation  Terciles based on the percentage of shares allocated to FII investors relative to the 
total shares allocated to total FII investors.   
Cold IPOs  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for IPOs with underpricing of 10% or 
less and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the key variables of 103 bookbuilding and auction IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and/or National Stock Exchange between 
2003 and 2006. The statistical significance of the differences in mean (median) is tested using the t-test (Mann-Whitney test). Column 5 (6) provides t-stat and (p-values) (z-test (p-
values)) for the difference in mean (median). Appendix A provides definitions of all the variables. 
 
 Total 
(1) 
Bookbuilding 
(2) 
Auction 
(3) 
Diff (2 ± 3) 
(4) 
t-stat (p-value) 
(5) 
z-test (p-value) 
(6) 
Panel A: Firm and offer characteristics       
Assets (INR Million) 5,730 (1,800) 6,664 (1,895) 5,005 (1,766) 1,658 (129) 0.732 (0.466) 0.246 (0.806) 
Age 15.24 (12.81) 15.82 (12.00) 14.79 (12.87) 1.034 (-0.87) 0.441 (0.660) -0.532 (0.594) 
Proceeds (INR Million) 2,673 (1,080) 3,435 (1,000) 2,083 (1,090) 1,352 (-90) 1.266 (0.208) -0.150 (0.881) 
Shares Offered (Million) 21.56 (8.15) 32.78 (10.00) 12.92 (6.85) 19.86 (3.15) 1.975 (0.051) 2.071 (0.038) 
Underwriter Reputation 0.68 (1.00) 0.72 (1.00) 0.66 (1.00) 0.06 (0.00) 0.661 (0.510) 0.663 (0.507) 
Total Demand Multiple 23.54 (18.67) 26.31 (22.64) 21.45 (12.42) 4.86 (10.22) 1.148 (0.254) 1.855 (0.063) 
Number of Institutional Bids 122 (86) 148 (97) 106 (71) 42 (26) 1.651 (0.102) 1,962 (0.050) 
Institutional Demand Multiple 25.77 (18.43) 23.31 (18.76) 27.63 (17.44) -4.32 (1.32) -0.787 (0.433) 0.185 (0.854) 
Underpricing 0.305 (0.22) 0.34 (0.26) 0.28 (0.15) 0.06 (0.11) 0.662 (0.509) 1.579 (0.114) 
       
Panel B: Allocation & Flipping ± FIIs       
Share allocated as a percent of total institutional quota  0.52 (0.53) 0.50 (0.50) 0.54 (0.54) -0.04 (-0.04) -1.319 (0.190) -1.021 (0.307) 
Average size of allocation µ 306 (136) 357 (136) 266 (134) 91 (2) 0.925 (0.357) 0.217 (0.624) 
Average size of flipping ± µ 130 (41) 134 (38) 126 (43) 8 (-5) 0.119 (0.902) 0.497 (0.481) 
Shares flipped as a percent of allocation 0.43 (0.45) 0.38 (0.40) 0.47 (0.52) -0.09 (-0.12) -1.865 (0.065) -4.276 (0.033) 
Observations 103 45 58    
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Table 2: Flipping: Univariate Analysis  
Table 2 shows the univariate analysis of flipping in the first 3 days of listing for 3,009 IPO allocations to foreign institutional investors (FIIs) investors for a sample of 45 
bookbuilding and 58 auction IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and/or National Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2006. We present statistics for three terciles of 
allocation based on the percentage of shares allocated to FIIs. The statistical significance of the differences in mean (median) is tested using the t-test (Mann-Whitney test). 
Column 5 (6) provides t-stat and (p-values) (z-test (p-values)) for the difference in mean (median). F-stat (p-value) is the test statistic (p-value) of Anova F-test to test for 
equality across the three allocation categories.  
 
 
 
 Overall 
(1) 
Bookbuilding 
(2) 
Auction 
(3) 
Diff (2 ± 3) 
(4) 
t-stat (p-value) 
(5) 
z-test (p-value) 
(6) 
Tercile 1(n=1,003)       
Shares allocated as  percent of total FII allocation 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 0.894 (0.371) 1.566 (0.212) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation  0.36 (0.00) 0.33 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) -0.09 (0.00) -2.908 (0.003) -4.251 (0.018) 
Tercile 2(n=1,013)       
Shares allocated as  percent of total FII allocation 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.00) 1.432 (0.285) 3.248 (0.068) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation  0.45 (0.35) 0.32 (0.00) 0.53 (0.61) -0.21 (-0.61) -6.948 (0.000) -36.812 (0.000) 
Tercile  3(n=993)       
Shares allocated as  percent of total FII allocation 0.11 (0.06) 0.11 (0.06) 0.10 (0.06) 0.001 (0.002) 0.481 (0.630) 3.236 (0.072) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation  0.38 (0.17) 0.34 (0.02) 0.42 (0.24) -0.08 (-0.53) -4.690 (0.000) -8.715 (0.000) 
       
Shares allocated  percent - F-stat  (p-value) 665.38 (0.000) 351.21 (0.000) 280.72 (0.000)    
Share flipped  percent - F-stat (p-value) 11.68 (0.000) 0.06 (0.943) 11.05 (0.000)    
Observations 3,009 1,403 1,606    
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Table 3: IPO Investor Flipping: OLS regression analysis  
Table 3 reports the estimates of the OLS regression analysis of IPO investor flipping in the first 3 days of listing for 3,009 
IPO allocations to foreign institutional investors (FIIs) investors for a sample of 45 bookbuilding and 58 auction IPOs 
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and/or National Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2006. The dependent variable 
in all the specifications is the fraction of shares sold in the first 3 days of listing. Appendix A provides definitions of all 
the variables. All tests use White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The p-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistically significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. 
 Overall 
(1) 
Tercile 1 
(2) 
Tercile 2 
(3) 
Tercile 3 
(4) 
Overall 
(5) 
Tercile 1 
(6) 
Tercile 2 
(7) 
Tercile 3 
(8) 
Mechanism -0.080*** -0.011 -0.158*** -0.065*** 0.128** 0.200 0.270* 0.070 
 (-5.09) (-0.32) (-5.22) (-2.86) (2.04) (0.80) (1.73) (0.93) 
         
Market Condition 0.632*** 0.045 0.688 0.668** 0.588** 0.002 0.674 0.602** 
 (2.63) (0.07) (1.43) (2.21) (2.43) (0.00) (1.42) (1.98) 
         
Reputation -0.065** -0.085 0.009 -0.109*** 0.002 0.026 0.117 -0.058 
 (-2.03) (-0.65) (0.13) (-3.15) (0.05) (0.14) (1.48) (-1.25) 
         
Proceeds (log) -0.048*** -0.072*** -0.083*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.080*** -0.086*** -0.052*** 
 (-5.96) (-4.20) (-5.04) (-3.79) (-6.05) (-4.50) (-5.12) (-3.79) 
         
Cold -0.058*** -0.037 -0.063* -0.023 -0.019 0.078 0.019 -0.011 
 (-2.70) (-0.66) (-1.67) (-0.70) (-0.72) (1.02) (0.40) (-0.28) 
         
Mechanism × Reputation    -0.201*** -0.180 -0.402** -0.147** 
     (-3.09) (-0.72) (-2.52) (-2.19) 
         
Mechanism × Cold    -0.110*** -0.248** -0.204*** -0.049 
     (-2.71) (-2.30) (-2.77) (-0.83) 
         
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.915*** 1.174*** 1.158*** 0.912*** 0.861*** 1.120*** 1.073*** 0.874*** 
 (14.20) (6.44) (8.37) (9.45) (12.23) (4.76) (7.49) (8.54) 
Observations 3,009 1,003 1,013 993 3,009 1,003 1,013 993 
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.054 0.096 0.062 0.062 0.057 0.106 0.064 
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Table 4: Frequent and non-frequent investors: Univariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the univariate statistics of flipping in the first 3 days of listing by frequent and non-frequent IPO investors. Panel A shows statistics of bidding by fund 
families in the 45 bookbuilding and 58 auction IPOs. Panel B compares flipping by frequent and non-frequent investors between bookbuilding and auction IPO investors 
while Panel C shows flipping by frequent and non-frequent investors in bookbuilding and auction IPOs for the three allocation terciles. The allocation terciles are based 
on the percentage of shares allocated to FIIs. The statistical significance of the differences in mean (median) is tested using the t-test (Mann-Whitney test). 
 
Panel A: Fund family participation in IPOs 
 
 Total Bookbuilding Auction 
# of fund families bidding in:    
1-2 IPOs 187 154 132 
3-9 IPOs 162 106 48 
10 or more IPOs 49 44 49 
Total 398 304 243 
# of IPOs bids by fund families    
25th Percentile 5 4 4 
Mean 25 12 17 
Median 14 9 15 
75th Percentile 38 18 28 
 
 
Panel B: By mechanism and investors 
 
 
  
  Frequent Investors   Non-Frequent Investors 
 Bookbuilding  
(1) 
Auction 
(2) 
Diff (1-2) 
(3) 
p-values 
(4) 
 Bookbuilding  
(5) 
Auction 
(6) 
Diff (5-6) 
(7) 
p-values 
(8) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation         
Tercile 1  0.51 (0.50) 0.57 (0.94) -0.06 (-0.44) 0.295 (0.322)  0.26 (0.00) 0.37 (0.00) -0.11 (0.00) 0.001 (0.009) 
Tercile 2  0.45 (0.34) 0.57 (0.68) -0.12 (-0.34) 0.004 (0.005)  0.21 (0.00) 0.46 (0.28) -0.25 (-0.28) 0.000 (0.000) 
Tercile 3 0.38 (0.16) 0.45 (0.33) -0.07 (-0.17) 0.006 (0.002)  0.19 (0.00) 0.25 (0.00) -0.06 (0.00) 0.245 (0.022) 
Observations 661 988    742 618   
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Panel C: By mechanism, investors and allocation terciles 
 
 
 
 
 
 Overall 
(1) 
Frequent 
Investors  
(2) 
Non-Frequent Investors 
(3) 
Diff 2-3) 
(4) 
t-stat (p-value) 
(5) 
z-test (p-value) 
(6) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation ± Overall 0.40 (0.05) 0.48 (0.48) 0.31 (0.00) 0.17 (0.48) 10.456 (0.000) 111.54 (0.000) 
       
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation ± Bookbuilding 0.33 (0.00) 0.43 (0.27) 0.24 (0.00) 0.19 (0.27) 6.897 (0.000) 54.08 (0.000) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation ± Auction  0.46 (0.36) 0.51 (0.52) 0.40 (0.00) 0.11 (0.55) 5.216 (0.000) 26.31 (0.000) 
Diff (Bookbuilding ± Auction) -0.13 (-0.36) -0.08 (-0.25) -0.16 (0.00)    
t-stat (p-value) -8.144 (0.000) -3.422 (0.000) -5.675 (0.000)    
z-test (p-value) 53.64 (0.000) 9.886 (0.001) 18.583 (0.000)    
Observations 3,009 1,649 1,360    
# of allocations by terciles       
First  250 763    
Second  580 453    
Third  819 144    
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Table 5: Frequent and non-frequent investors: OLS regression analysis 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the OLS regression analysis of flipping in the first 3 days of listing for 3,009 IPO allocations to foreign institutional investors (FIIs) investors for a 
sample of 45 bookbuilding and 58 auction IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and/or National Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2006. The dependent variable in all the 
specifications is the fraction of shares sold in the first 3 days of listing.  Appendix A provides definitions of all the variables. All tests use White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
The p-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. 
 
 Frequent Investors  Non-Frequent Investors 
 Overall 
(1) 
Tercile 2 
(2) 
Tercile 3 
(3) 
Overall 
(4) 
Tercile 2 
(5) 
Tercile 3 
(6) 
 Overall 
(7) 
Tercile 2 
(8) 
Tercile 3 
(9) 
Overall 
(10) 
Tercile 2 
(11) 
Tercile 3 
(12) 
Mechanism -0.068*** -0.088* -0.068** 0.146** 0.401*** 0.084  -0.091*** -0.197*** -0.031 0.129 -0.592*** 0.315 
 
(-2.93) (-1.94) (-2.15) (2.15) (2.65) (1.09)  (-3.07) (-3.88) (-0.46) (0.61) (-3.75) (1.14) 
 
             
Market Condition  0.679** 0.656 0.781** 0.608** 0.662 0.683**  0.388 1.128 0.180 0.379 1.211 0.248 
 
(2.44) (1.16) (2.32) (2.17) (1.22) (2.01)  (0.80) (1.23) (0.28) (0.79) (1.30) (0.39) 
 
             
Reputation -0.075** -0.070 -0.094** -0.003 0.075 -0.037  -0.005 0.049 -0.181 0.034 0.032 -0.098 
 
(-2.11) (-0.79) (-2.32) (-0.07) (0.73) (-0.74)  (-0.06) (0.40) (-1.43) (0.38) (0.23) (-0.71) 
 
             
Proceeds (log) -0.009 -0.026 -0.038** -0.013 -0.034 -0.041**  -0.050*** -0.097*** -0.049* -0.049*** -0.101*** -0.050* 
 
(-0.79) (-1.08) (-2.35) (-1.12) (-1.41) (-2.50)  (-3.58) (-3.65) (-1.68) (-3.38) (-3.68) (-1.70) 
 
             
Cold IPOs -0.042 -0.017 -0.014 0.003 0.064 0.010  -0.163*** -0.149** -0.105 -0.156*** -0.111 -0.119 
 
(-1.63) (-0.35) (-0.39) (0.10) (1.18) (0.23)  (-4.37) (-2.49) (-1.44) (-3.17) (-1.26) (-1.32) 
 
             
Mechanism × Reputation    -0.203*** -0.464*** -0.158**     -0.223 0.424 -0.373 
 
   (-2.87) (-2.94) (-2.23)     (-1.06) (1.01) (-1.37) 
 
             
Mechanism × Cold    -0.131*** -0.254*** -0.075**     -0.012 -0.101 0.012 
 
   (-2.67) (-2.73) (-2.02)     (-0.16) (-0.83) (0.07) 
 
             
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
             
Constant 0.654*** 0.843*** 0.816*** 0.609*** 0.758*** 0.785***  0.829*** 1.067*** 0.864*** 0.781*** 1.120*** 0.795*** 
 
(7.57) (4.57) (7.19) (6.68) (4.00) (6.60)  (5.93) (4.36) (3.43) (5.31) (4.34) (3.03) 
Observations 1649 580 819 1649 580 819  1360 453 144 1360 453 144 
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.065 0.052  0.058 0.126 0.088 0.058 0.125 0.090 
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Table 6: Long term IPO holdings: Univariate analysis 
Table 6 reports the univariate statistics of fraction of shares sold in the first six months of listing. Panel A compares fraction of shares sold by frequent and non-frequent investors 
between bookbuilding and auction IPO investors while Panel C shows fraction of shares sold by frequent and non-frequent investors in bookbuilding and auction IPOs for the 
three allocation terciles. The allocation terciles are based on the percentage of shares allocated to FIIs. The statistical significance of the differences in mean (median) is tested 
using the t-test (Mann-Whitney test).   
 
Panel A: By mechanism and investors 
 
 
 
Panel B: By mechanism, investors and allocation terciles 
 
 
 Overall 
(1) 
Frequent Investors 
(2) 
Non-Frequent Investors 
(3) 
Diff (2-3) 
(4) 
t-stat (p-value) 
(5) 
z-test (p-value) 
(6) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation ± Overall 0.47 (0.38) 0.54 (0.57) 0.39 (0.00) 0.15 (0.57) 7.702 (0.000) 68.64 (0.000) 
       
Shares flipped as percent of allocation ± Bookbuilding 0.42 (0.15) 0.50 (0.52) 0.32 (0.00) 0.18 (0.52) 6.189 (0.000) 37.01 (0.000) 
Shares flipped as percent of allocation ± Auction  0.51 (0.57) 0.56 (0.69) 0.46 (0.00) 0.11 (0.69) 5.237 (0.000) 19.56 (0.000) 
Diff (Bookbuilding ± Auction) -0.09 (-0.42) -0.06 (-0.17) -0.14 (0.00)    
t-stat (p-value) -5.25 (0.000) -2.46 (0.014) -3.274 (0.000)    
z-test (p-value) 20.84 (0.000) 4.077 (0.035) 6.914 (0.000)    
Observations  1,649 1,360    
  Frequent Investors   Non-Frequent Investors 
 Bookbuilding  
(1) 
Auction 
(2) 
Diff (1-2) 
(3) 
p-values 
(4) 
 Bookbuilding  
(5) 
Auction 
(6) 
Diff (5-6) 
(7) 
p-values 
(8) 
Shares flipped as  percent of allocation         
Tercile 1  0.83 (1.00) 0.66 (1.00) 0.17 (0.00) 0.311 (0.881)  0.41 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 0.799 (0.895) 
Tercile 2  0.55 (0.59) 0.62 (0.82) -0.07 (-0.23) 0.069 (0.212)  0.29 (0.00) 0.52 (0.76) -0.23 (-0.76) 0.000 (0.000) 
Tercile 3 0.46 (0.38) 0.51 (0.50) -0.05 (-0.12) 0.145 (0.154)  0.32 (0.00) 0.32 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.999 (0.154) 
Observations 661 988    742 618   
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Table 7: Long term holdings: OLS regression analysis 
Table 7 reports the estimates of the OLS regression analysis of the fraction of shares sold in the first six months of listing for 3,009 IPO allocations to foreign institutional investors (FIIs) 
investors for a sample of 45 bookbuilding and 58 auction IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and/or National Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2006. The dependent variable in 
all the specifications is the fraction of shares sold in the first six months of listing.  Appendix A provides definitions of all the variables. All tests use White heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors. The p-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. 
 
 
 Frequent Investors  Non-Frequent Investors 
 Overall 
(1) 
Tercile 2 
(2) 
Tercile 3 
(3) 
Overall 
(4) 
Tercile 2 
(5) 
Tercile 3 
(6) 
 Overall 
(7) 
Tercile 2 
(8) 
Tercile 3 
(9) 
Overall 
(10) 
Tercile 2 
(11) 
Tercile 3 
(12) 
Mechanism -0.014 -0.068 -0.039 0.200*** 0.506*** 0.067  -0.007 -0.185*** 0.032 0.115 -0.721*** 0.268 
 
(-0.41) (-1.51) (-1.16) (2.83) (3.68) (0.86)  (-0.21) (-3.38) (0.43) (0.45) (-4.60) (0.87) 
 
       
      
Stock Return  0.009 0.030 -0.063*** 0.015 0.044 -0.060***  0.076*** 0.103*** -0.103*** 0.073*** 0.089** -0.103*** 
 
(0.40) (1.07) (-3.10) (0.61) (1.55) (-2.97)  (3.67) (2.76) (-2.87) (3.51) (2.32) (-2.76) 
 
       
      
Reputation -0.095** -0.083 -0.081* -0.030 0.076 -0.043  -0.113 0.003 -0.190 -0.080 -0.002 -0.123 
 
(-2.37) (-0.91) (-1.95) (-0.59) (0.71) (-0.86)  (-1.34) (0.02) (-1.39) (-0.88) (-0.01) (-0.82) 
 
       
      
Proceeds (log) 0.026 -0.025 -0.036** 0.020 -0.033 -0.038**  -0.063*** -0.096*** -0.071** -0.067*** -0.106*** -0.070** 
 
(1.10) (-1.00) (-2.12) (0.85) (-1.33) (-2.24)  (-4.11) (-3.40) (-2.27) (-4.17) (-3.62) (-2.21) 
 
       
      
Cold IPOs -0.117*** -0.088* -0.024 -0.055* 0.004 -0.004  -0.217*** -0.176*** -0.077 -0.172*** -0.088 -0.110 
 
(-3.76) (-1.90) (-0.70) (-1.65) (0.08) (-0.10)  (-5.82) (-3.02) (-1.09) (-3.39) (-1.01) (-1.19) 
 
   
   
    
   
Mechanism × Reputation    -0.187** -0.543*** -0.108     -0.105 0.597 -0.276 
 
   (-2.54) (-3.86) (-1.30)     (-0.41) (1.36) (-0.88) 
 
   
   
    
   
Mechanism × Cold    -0.176*** -0.304*** -0.055     -0.114 -0.228* 0.070 
 
   (-3.28) (-3.23) (-0.82)     (-1.47) (-1.82) (0.40) 
 
             
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
             
Constant 0.545*** 0.968*** 0.903*** 0.609*** 0.758*** 0.785***  1.162*** 1.360*** 1.071*** 1.156*** 1.450*** 1.012*** 
 
(3.33) (5.11) (7.63) (6.68) (4.00) (6.60)  (7.94) (5.24) (4.13) (7.54) (5.41) (3.73) 
Observations 1649 580 819 1649 580 819  1360 453 144 1360 453 144 
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.054 0.060 0.049 0.065 0.052  0.054 0.128 0.096 0.054 0.133 0.093 
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Table 8: Long term holdings: Probit regression analysis 
Table 8 reports the estimates of the probit regression analysis of the fraction of shares sold in the first six months of listing for 3,009 IPO allocations to foreign institutional 
investors (FIIs) investors for a sample of 45 bookbuilding and 58 auction IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and/or National Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2006. 
The dependent variable in all the specifications takes the value of 1 if investors hold their entire allocation at the end of six months and zero otherwise. Appendix A provides 
definitions of all the variables. All tests use White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The p-values are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at 1 
percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively. 
 
 
 Frequent Investors  Non-Frequent Investors 
 Overall 
(1) 
Tercile 2 
(2) 
Tercile 3 
(3) 
Overall 
(4) 
Tercile 2 
(5) 
Tercile 3 
(6) 
 Overall 
(7) 
Tercile 2 
(8) 
Tercile 3 
(9) 
Overall 
(10) 
Tercile 2 
(11) 
Tercile 3 
(12) 
Mechanism 0.142** 0.277** 0.064 -1.004*** -5.435*** -0.841***  0.116 0.442*** 0.246 -0.302 4.986*** -0.221 
 
(2.14) (2.28) (0.68) (-4.60) (-16.54) (-3.40)  (1.55) (3.42) (1.13) (-0.46) (11.23) (-0.24) 
 
 
     
  
     
Stock Return  -0.282*** 0.076 -0.399*** -0.324*** 0.115 -0.461***  0.011 0.183 -0.719*** 0.020 0.261 -0.742*** 
 
(-3.15) (0.39) (-3.41) (-3.75) (0.57) (-4.02)  (0.10) (0.90) (-2.66) (0.19) (1.26) (-2.73) 
 
 
     
  
     
Reputation -0.071 -0.275 0.010 -0.401*** -0.695*** -0.296**  0.208 -0.198 0.413 0.070 -0.275 0.254 
 
(-0.70) (-1.21) (0.08) (-3.43) (-2.81) (-2.02)  (0.89) (-0.57) (1.02) (0.27) (-0.75) (0.55) 
 
 
     
  
     
Proceeds (log) -0.094*** 0.010 -0.177*** -0.093*** 0.026 -0.185***  0.095** 0.170** -0.093 0.110*** 0.200*** -0.102 
 
(-2.78) (0.15) (-3.33) (-2.71) (0.38) (-3.48)  (2.48) (2.44) (-0.94) (2.79) (2.81) (-1.01) 
 
 
     
  
     
Cold IPOs -0.110 0.096 -0.225* -0.262** 0.002 -0.328**  0.410*** 0.565*** -0.082 0.224 0.368 0.002 
 
(-1.23) (0.55) (-1.86) (-2.49) (0.01) (-2.31)  (3.19) (2.77) (-0.29) (1.48) (1.57) (0.00) 
 
   
   
    
   
Mechanism × Reputation    1.172*** 5.720*** 1.006***     0.351 -0.687 0.571 
 
   (5.24) (18.19) (3.84)     (0.53) (-1.10) (0.62) 
 
   
   
    
   
Mechanism × Cold    0.372** 0.449 0.229     0.506** 0.658* -0.219 
 
   (2.51) (1.51) (1.15)     (2.29) (1.94) (-0.46) 
 
             
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
             
Constant 0.358 -0.560 1.035*** 0.688** -0.300 1.389***  -1.060*** -1.632** 0.649 -1.017** -1.806** 0.828 
 
(1.37) (-1.01) (2.71) (2.53) (-0.53) (3.53)  (-2.60) (-2.35) (0.77) (-2.38) (-2.52) (0.96) 
Observations 1649 580 819 1649 580 819  1360 453 144 1360 453 144 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.010 0.024 0.029 0.036 0.040  0.013 0.051 0.051 0.016 0.060 0.054 
